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What brings me here this evening is an invitation I
received from Professor Robinson to participate in this Reli-
gion Clauses Conference by defending the absolutist position
in respect to the first amendment's establishment clause.' My
adversary, he said, would be Professor Robert Cord, who
would present what he called a nonpreferentialist approach to
the controversy. Professor Cord is indeed a worthy adversary.
I can testify to this because we crossed swords some four years
ago at New York Law School. Since then the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in the Jafree case.2 As will later be
seen, his book, Separation of Church and State. Historical Fact and
Current Fiction' played a significant role injustice (now Chief
Justice) William Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in that case,
considerably more than is indicated by the simple note in the
opinion "See generally R. Cord, Separation of Church and State
61-82 (1982). "4
* Until his retirement in 1980, Leo Pfeffer was a professor of political
science at Long Island University. He is now an adjunct professor there. He
was for many years the special counsel for the American Jewish Congress. In
that capacity he argued several landmark church-state cases before the
Supreme Court. He is also the author of several books and articles in the
church-state area. This paper was prepared for delivery at the Notre Dame
Conference on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, March 31,
1989.
1. The first amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."
2. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
3. (1982).
4. 472 U.S. at 104. The book was highly praised by, among others,
William F. Buckley, Jr., Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Professor
Charles E. Rice of Notre Dame Law School. The last named, in a book jacket
comment on Cord's book, wrote: "This compelling study demonstrates that
the prevailing view of the religion clauses of the First Amendment is not only
unwise but fictional. If heeded by the Supreme Court, Professor Cord's
analysis will profoundly alter our constitutional future."
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Lawyers and scholars cognizant in the field of church-state
separation are aware that I consistently defend a position called
absolutist or extremist or doctrinaire or unrealistic. Perhaps
the most charitable name is the term "strict separationist" in
contrast to what is often called "accommodationist." I am,
therefore, quite happy to defend the absolutist position here
today. For all my adult life, though, I have been a lawyer, so I
shall defend it from a lawyer's perspective, by looking to
Supreme Court cases rather than to philosophy or theology.
II. ANTE JAFFREE
Every jurist, lawyer or political scientist recognizes that
one hundred per cent strict separation of church and state can-
not be achieved at all times and in all places. Indeed, even
where strict separation seems clearly called for, it is sometimes
neglected. There are many ways in which the Supreme Court
can avoid (or perhaps evade) voiding action which would seem
clearly to violate the establishment clause. The case of Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc.5 illustrates one. That was an establishment clause
suit challenging the action of the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare in turning over to a religious college, without
compensation, a land and building thereon for which the gov-
ernment had no further use.
There was strong precedent to support the plaintiff's suit.
President James Madison (who more than anyone else must
have known what the establishment clause meant) vetoed a
measure "reserving a certain parcel of land of the United States
for the use of said Baptist Church" because it was "contrary" to
the Establishment Clause.6 In Valley Forge, however, Justice
Rehnquist, speaking for himself and four other members of the
Court, disposed of the matter by ruling that as mere taxpayers
the plaintiffs had no standing to bring the suit. This ruling was
determinative even if no non-religious college willing to bring
a suit could be found. A similar device was used in the case of
Karcher v. May,7 dealt with in Part II of this paper.
Strange as it may seem, you can lose a case by winning it.
This is what happened in Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of
Miami.8 This was a taxpayer's suit that I brought to challenge a
5. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
6. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 490 (J. Richardson ed.
1900).
7. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
8. 404 U.S. 412 (1972).
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statute granting full tax exemption to a church which used its
property for religious services on Sundays but for commercial
parking places the other six days of the week. In the time
between the submission of all briefs and the date of the argu-
ment before the Supreme Court, the Florida legislature
amended the statute to read that church property was exempt
from taxation only if the property was used predominately for
religious purposes and only "to the extent of the ratio that such
predominant use bears to the non-exempt use." The Court
dismissed the case as moot, leaving the constitutional issue up
in the air, where it floats to this day.
Another way of disposing of an establishment clause issue
is by ignoring it. This is what happened in Marsh v. Chambers,9
in which a member of the Nebraska legislature brought suit
challenging the engagement of a chaplain to open each session
with a prayer. In the beginning of the Court's opinion by Chief
Justice Warren Burger, notice was taken that both the district
court and the court of appeals held the challenged rule uncon-
stitutional under the establishment clause. Beyond this, the
clause was almost completely ignored, and the lower courts'
decision ruled erroneous in view of the fact that the engage-
ment of a chaplain was a long-time practice of the federal Con-
gress; and if the national government can do it, why not the
states? Ignored also was Justice William Brennan's dissent
which judged the practice violative of all three parts of the pur-
pose-effect-entanglement test of constitutionality, the last third
of which was Chief Justice Burger's creation.
Reading these opinions and others like them, one would
get the impression that strict separationism is so firmly
entrenched in American jurisprudence that the only way the
Court could refrain from striking down measures to aid paro-
chial schools or other religious institutions was to shun refer-
ence to the establishment clause altogether. On its face this
would seem to be so, in view of the no-aid principle set forth in
Justice Hugo Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of Education 10
and the purpose-effect-entanglement test set forth in Walz v.
Tax Commission. "
In Everson the Court said:
The "Establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
9. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
10. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
.11. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
1990]
702 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or pre-
fer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any reli-
gious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or prac-
tice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separa-
tion between church and State."' 2
Notwithstanding this, the Court by a 5-4 vote upheld the con-
stitutionality of a New Jersey statute financing transportation to
both public and religious schools. This impelled dissenting
Justice Robert Jackson to say: "The case which irresistibly
comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that ofJulia who,
according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er con-
sent," consented.' ''13 This would seem hardly fair to Black's
majority opinion, which justified, at least in part, the purpose of
protecting pupils from the hazards of traffic, just as public
funds are used to provide ordinary services such as police and
fire protection. The difficulty with this defense, however, is
that it has no application in respect to the loan of secular text-
books to parochial schools, a practice held constitutional, albeit
over Black's dissent, in Board of Education v. Allen.1
4
Nor does a basic services rationale have any application to
the case of McGowan v. Maryland, 5 in which a majority of the
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren, upheld
against an establishment clause challenge a statute forbidding
the doing of store business on Sundays. It should be noted
that this claim had earlier been made in a number of cases,
including Friedman v. New York 16 which I had brought to the
Supreme Court and which had been dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question. In retrospect, it turns out there
12. 330 U.S. at 15.
13. Id. at 19.
14. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
15. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
16. 341 U.S. 907 (1951).
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was a substantial federal question after all. In fact, the Court
said in McGowan that in earlier times Sunday laws would have
been deemed religiously motivated. But their purpose now was
to assure the secular ends of rest, relaxation and family togeth-
erness, and could not therefore be treated as laws aiding reli-
gion. ChiefJustice Warren set forth a review of establishment
clause cases from 1791 to 1961, including the Everson para-
graph in full. He distinguished all these as irrelevant, and
ended with the following dictum:
We do not hold that Sunday legislation may not be a vio-
lation of the "Establishment" Clause if it can be demon-
strated that its purpose - evidenced either on the face of
the legislation, in conjunction with its legislative history,
or in its operative effect - is to use the State's coercive
power to aid religion.'
7
Two years after McGowan, the Court, in Abington School Dis-
trict v. Schempp 18 (in a decision from which there was only one
dissent), extracted from McGowan's purpose-effect dictum a
full-fledged holding and test, and did so while reaffirming the
no-aid dictum of Everson. This is what the Court said in
Schempp:
As we have indicated, the Establishment Clause has been
directly considered by this Court eight times in the past
score of years and, with only one Justice dissenting on
the point, it has consistently held that the clause with-
drew all legislative power respecting religious belief or
the expression thereof. The test may be stated as fol-
lows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legisla-
tive power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is
to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establish-
ment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. 9
In Walz v. Tax Commission,2" in an opinion by Chief Justice
Burger, the Court added the entanglement principle. The tril-
ogy of purpose-effect-entanglement was drawn together in the
17. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 446.
18. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Court held violative of the establishment
clause a Pennsylvania statute providing for Bible reading in public schools,
and a Maryland rule providing for recitation of the Lord's Prayer.
19. Id. at 222.
20. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
1990]
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joint opinion of Lemon v. Kurtzman and Earley v. DiCenso (herein-
after Lemon). 2 Specifically, in ruling unconstitutional a law
providing financial aid to parochial schools, the Court
explained that, to pass constitutional muster, a statute "must
have [first] a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; [and] finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' "22 This three-part
test is the standard modern formulation of the strict separa-
tionist position.
Before, however, we turn to Part II of this paper it is
appropriate to note that absolutism or strict separationism
between church and state in respect to the establishment clause
was not the creation of the Justices who decided the Everson or
Lemon cases. Aside from Jefferson and Madison and indeed
more than a century before them, Roger Williams wrote his
famous letter to the Town of Providence spelling out the rela-
tionship between government and religion in terms of the
rightful powers and duties of a ship's commander at sea:
There goes [he said] many a ship to sea, with many
hundred souls in one ship, whose weal and woe is com-
mon, and is a true picture of a commonwealth, or a
human combination or society. It hath fallen out some-
times, that both papists [that is, Catholics] and protes-
tants, Jews and Turks [that is, Muslims], may be
embarked in one ship; upon which supposal I affirm, that
all the liberty of conscience, that ever I pleaded for, turns
upon these two hinges-that none of the papists, protes-
tants, Jews, or Turks, be forced to come to the ship's
prayers or worship, nor compelled from their own partic-
ular prayers or worship, if they practice any. I further
add, that I never denied, that, notwithstanding this lib-
erty, the commander of this ship ought to command the
ship's course, yea, and also command that justice, peace
and sobriety, be kept and practiced, both among the
seamen and all the passengers. 23
21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
22. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
23. The passage continues:
If any of the seamen refuse to perform their services, or passengers
to pay their freight; if any refuse to help, in person or purse, towards
the common charges or defence; if any refuse to obey the common
laws and orders of the ship, concerning their common peace or
preservation; if any shall mutiny and rise up against their
commanders and officers; if any should preach or write that there
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This letter merits the most careful study, for it sets forth
with clarity and brevity the three basic principles upon which a
religious pluralistic society can best survive and flourish
according to the great American experiment of religious liberty
and the separation of church and state: (1) there is a difference
between the sacred and the secular; (2) compulsion may be
exercised by officials of the state in the area of the secular but
not of the sacred; and (3) where the safety and security of the
commonwealth are concerned, religious conscience is not a
valid excuse for refusing to obey the lawful commands of the
state.
To be sure, there will always be disputes over the applica-
tion of these principles in practice. In distinguishing between
the sacred and the secular, for instance, is the claim that a Crea-
tor created the universe and all living things a secular theory of
"creation-science" or is it religious? The Supreme Court held,
I believe correctly, that it was the latter.2 4 Is it improper com-
pulsion to provide textbooks for religious schools paid for with
tax moneys from individuals who do not believe in that reli-
gion? The Supreme Court held, I believe incorrectly, that it is
not.25 Finally, does the safety of the Republic demand that Air
Force officers be forbidden to wear the skull caps that their reli-
gion demands? I think not, but again the Supreme Court
decided otherwise. 26 Disputes over the application of princi-
ples, however, do not mean that the principles themselves
should be rejected or we would have no principles left. Even
nonpreferentialists sometimes disagree among themselves, as
will be seen later in this paper.
The important point is that these separationist principles
were restated again and again and again both before and after
the establishment clause was adopted, and often by people who
had no knowledge of Roger Williams or his beliefs. In 1776, a
ought to be no commanders or officers, because all are equal in
Christ, therefore no masters nor officers, no laws nor orders, nor
corrections nor punishments;-I say, I never denied, but in such
cases, whatever is pretended, the commander or commanders may
judge, resist, compel and punish such transgressors, according to
their deserts and merits.
Letter from Roger Williams to the Town of Providence, in 6 THE COMPLETE
WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 278-79 (P. Miller ed. 1963).
24. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
25. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
26. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); compare Anderson v.
Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (compulsory church attendance at
military academies unconstitutional), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1982).
1990]
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century after Williams and before there was a first amendment,
Thomas Paine wrote in Common Sense:
"As to religion, I hold it to be the indispensable duty of
government to protect all conscientious professors
thereof, and I know of no other business which govern-
ment hath to do therewith." 27
After the passing of Jefferson and Madison, but prior to
Everson, we have among protagonists for complete church-state
separation Jeremiah Black, a recognized great jurist. In 1885
he said:
The manifest object of the men who framed the insti-
tutions of this country, was to have a State without reli-
gion and a Church without politics - that is to say, they
meant that one should never be used as an engine for the
purposes of the other .... For that reason they built up a
wall of complete and perfect partition between the two.2 8
And from another great jurist, David Dudley Field, we have the
following:
"The greatest achievement ever made in the cause of
human progress is the total and final separation of church
and state."
29
What all this indicates is that strict separation of church and
state is a national commitment. From a constitutional point of
view, this commitment is applicable to the states only by reason
of the fourteenth amendment, and some critics of strict separa-
tion have attacked this extension as unjustified. There is sub-
stantial evidence, though, to support the proposition that the
citizens of the states, with few if any exceptions, are more com-
mitted to strict separation in respect to their constitutions than
nonpreferentialists or accommodationists would wish. Indeed,
fewer than a half dozen states omit provisions in their constitu-
tions expressly prohibiting use of public funds to aid sectarian
schools.3
Take New York for an example. Its constitution, adopted
in 1894, has as Article 11, Section 3 the following:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its
property or credit or any public money, or authorize or
permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or
27. 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 318-19
(1950).
28. J. BLACK, ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 18 (1885).
29. D.D. FIELD, JURISPRUDENCE 6 (1893).
30. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 602, 647 & n.6 (1971).
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maintenance, other than for examination and inspection,
of any school or institution of learning in whole or in part
under the control or direction of any religious denomina-
tion, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught, but the legislature may provide for the transpor-
tation of children to and from any school or institution of
learning.
There could scarcely be a more absolutist provision to a
constitution than the one just quoted. I say "scarcely" because
the final clause of the provision has a less than absolutist ring
to it. History goes a long way toward explaining that clause. In
1938, in Judd v. Board of Education,3 1 New York's highest court
held invalid under Article 11, Section 3, a state statute provid-
ing transportation to and from religious schools. This decision
was abrogated when the state constitution was amended to add
what became its final clause. The reader will recall that in Ever-
son the Supreme Court held state-funded transportation to be
permissible under the federal establishment clause.
Not surprisingly, even as amended, Article 11, Section 3
did not satisfy anti-absolutists, and, led by Francis Cardinal
Spellman, they launched a strong campaign to repeal Section 3
in its entirety. In addition to the Orthodox Jewish Commu-
nity," Cardinal Spellman had some influential supporters,
including Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Senators Robert
Kennedy andJacobJavits. 3 3 Opposing them was a host of Prot-
estant, Jewish and non-sectarian organizations. 34  The net
result was a vote of almost 3 to 1 against the repeal proposi-
tion, a ratio that could not have been reached without the votes
of a substantial number of Catholics.
What happened in New York is hardly unique. According
to the Winter 1988 issue of Voice of Reason, fifteen referenda in
addition to New York's have been held on the subject of aid to
parochial schools. All but one concluded "no."
31. 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938).
32. The May 5, 1967 issue of the Jewish Press has a cartoon showing on
top the words "Yeshiva Education," on one side "Teaching Good Citizenship
and Proper Moral Behavior," and on the other side "Preservation of
Traditional Judaism." Between them is a sweating man holding the two apart
with the name "Pfeffer" on it and beneath it is the sentence: "Might As Well
Give Up, Mr. Pfeffer - A Samson You're Not!!" (copy on file in Leo Pfeffer
Papers, Syracuse University).
33. J. COONEY, THE AMERICAN POPE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FRANCIS
CARDINAL SPELLMAN 312 (1984).
34. The Brooklyn Tablet of June 6, 1967 declared me to be the leader of
this opposition.
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III. JAFFREE
We come now to the second and major part of this paper.
It deals with the case of Wallace v. Jaffree,"5 how it came about
and how it was finally resolved. It should be noted that it was
the case that was finally resolved, not the controversy relating to
strict or absolute separationism versus accommodationism;
that controversy will probably not be resolved until there be no
more church or no more state.
Involved in this litigation were three independent but
related Alabama statutes: one authorized a one-minute period
of silence "for meditation" in public schools; the second
authorized a period of silence "for meditation or voluntary
prayer," and the third authorized teachers to lead "willing stu-
dents" in a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God. .. the Creator
and Supreme Judge of the world." 36 Initially Ishmael Jaffree,
father of three public school children, challenged all three stat-
utes under the establishment clause. During the course of the
litigation, however, he decided not to question the validity of
the one that authorized one-minute silence "for meditation,"
so that this was no longer a controverted issue for judicial
determination. (I will return to this point later, but for the time
being it does not require further consideration.)
In respect to the other two statutes, District Court Chief
Judge William Brevard Hand ruled, on an application for a pre-
liminary injunction, that Jaffree was likely to prevail, and
accordingly granted the injunction.37 After a four-day trial on
the merits, however, Judge Hand changed his mind. He con-
cluded in the first place that the first amendment "prohibit[ed]
the federal government only from establishing a national reli-
gion. Anything short of the outright establishment of a
national religion was not seen as violative of the first amend-
ment."3 8 In reaching this nonpreferentialist position Judge
Hand relied heavily on Professor Cord, whose work, he said,
was "invaluable to the Court in this opinion." 9 Second, Judge
Hand determined that the fourteenth amendment did not make
the first amendment applicable to the states (noting that he was
parting company with Professor Cord on this point). 40 He
35. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
36. ALA. CoDE §§ 16-1-20 (1978); 16-1-20.1 (1981); 16-1-20.2 (1982).
37. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
38. Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1115
(S.D. Ala. 1983).
39. Id. at 1113-14 n.5.
40. Id. at 1124 n.33.
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held, consequently, that "the establishment clause.., does not
bar the states from establishing a religion."'" In effect, the
Judge overruled every Supreme Court decision since Everson
and McCollum that enunciated the no-aid principle, and every
case since Walz and Lemon that applied the purpose-effect-
entanglement test.
Jaffree's counsel applied for a stay of Judge Hand's judg-
ment to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, but this
was denied.42 The response of Jaffree's counsel was to apply
for a stay to Supreme Court Justice Powell in his capacity as a
Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit. There could be little
doubt, said Powell, that conducting prayers as part of a school
program violates the establishment clause under the Supreme
Court's decisions in Engel v. Vitale4" and Abington School District
v. Schempp.4 4 Accordingly, he said, a stay should be granted.4 5
The granting of the stay did not, of course, constitute a deter-
mination that the lower court's decision was erroneous. This
came about when the court of appeals determined that Hand's
ruling was in error in holding prayer in the public schools to be
permissible and, accordingly, reversed it.4 6
Intervening in support of Governor George Wallace was a
group consisting of Douglas T. Smith and more than 500
teachers and parents. They supported Judge Hand's position
that historically the first amendment was intended only to pro-
hibit establishment of a national religion and the fourteenth
amendment was never intended to incorporate the first amend-
ment. The court of appeals acknowledged that this view had
some scholarly support, and identified Professor Cord, among
others, as a proponent. It also recognized that others support
a strict separationist position, referring, among others, to Pro-
fessor Leonard Levy and to me.47 It concluded, though, that
the Supreme Court had already addressed these historical
issues, and that it had no power to overrule decisions of the
Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court of appeals ruled that
both the articulated prayer statute and the silent prayer statute
violated the establishment clause, and overruled the decision of
the district court as to both.
41. Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (S..D. Ala. 1983).
42. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11 th Cir. 1984).
43. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
44. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
45. Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, 459 U.S. 1314 (1983).
46. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11 th Cir. 1983).
47. Id. at 1530.
1990]
710 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
Now it was the turn of the defendants to appeal. They first
sought a rehearing by the full Eleventh Circuit en banc. This
application was denied, with four judges dissenting as to the
silent prayer law. Although the four judges (all, incidentally,
appointed by President Nixon) did not say they would uphold
the statute, they thought the issue sufficiently important and
doubtful to merit an en banc hearing.48 The next step was to
seek appeal to the Supreme Court. That Court, without dis-
sent, summarily affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in
respect to the articulated prayer ruling but, at the same time,
noted probable jurisdiction in respect to the silent prayer
holding.49
The Supreme Court heard the argument and affirmed the
decision, striking down the silent prayer statute by a six to
three vote.50 I shall deal with this decision shortly, but first let
me continue the story of the case. On remand, Judge Hand
realigned parties and issued a sort of "tit-for-tat" ruling-if
Alabama public school teachers could not lead their pupils in
prayer, they would not be able to lead them in anything else
either. In particular he held that forty-four textbooks used in
Alabama, in subjects ranging from history to home economics,
embodied what he termed the "religion of secular humanism,"
and therefore violated the (strict separationist) interpretation
of the establishment clause which had been thrust upon him.5'
The court of appeals reversed. It interpreted Judge Hand's
opinion as requiring " 'equal time' for religion," when the
establishment clause mandates "separation from religion."52 I
have dealt with this case and the question of secular humanism
elsewhere, 53 and shall not repeat myself here. Let me return
instead to the Supreme Court's treatment of Jaffree.
In the early days of the Supreme Court, when ChiefJustice
John Marshall reigned supreme, dissents and dissenting opin-
ions, particularly when he appointed himself to write the
Court's opinion, were a rarity. There was a variety of reasons
for this, not the least of which were his own personality and the
48. 713 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1983).
49. 466 U.S. 924 (1984). Petition for certiorari was denied with respect
to other aspects of the appeal, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
50. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
51. Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.
Ala. 1987).
52. 827 F.2d 684, 695 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original).
53. Pfeffer, The 'Religion' of Secular Humanism, 29 J. CHURCH AND STATE
495 (1987).
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general unimportance of the Court.54 IndeedJohnJay, the first
Chief Justice of the Court, resigned from that office to become
governor of New York and refused to come back when Presi-
dent John Adams offered him the position." Hence, Marshall
was appointed. In sharp contrast to decisions in the Marshall
era, the Jaffree case contains (1) a majority opinion of Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and
Powell; (2) a concurring opinion by Justice Powell; (3) an opin-
ion by Justice O'Connor concurring in the judgment but not in
the Stevens opinion; (4) a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice
Burger; (5) a dissenting opinion by Justice White that agreed in
the most part with the Chief Justice; and (6) a dissenting opin-
ion by Justice Rehnquist that agreed with nobody.
A practicing lawyer can see many advantages in the Mar-
shall system of one opinion per case. For present purposes,
however, the variety of opinions inJaffree offers an opportunity
to consider contrasting views on the proper nature of church-
state relations. We will deal with the opinions seriatim, begin-
ning, naturally, with that of Justice Stevens.
A. Justice Stevens' Opinion
Having unanimously upheld the court of appeals' ruling in
respect to articulated prayer, Justice Stevens had no obligation
to comment upon the district court's remarkable conclusion
that the first amendment does not apply to the states. 56 Never-
theless, Justice Stevens said, he would do that anyway.
"[F]irmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence [he
said] is the proposition that the several States have no greater
power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the
First Amendment than does the Congress of the United
54. See L. PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT 89-93 (1965).
55. Id. at 55, 67.
56. See School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-17 (1963):
First, this Court has decisively settled that the First
Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof" has been made wholly applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . . Second, this Court has rejected
unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids
only governmental preference of one religion over another . . ..
While none of the parties to either of these cases has questioned
these basic conclusions of the Court, both of which have been long
established, recognized and consistently reaffirmed, others continue
to question their history, logic and efficacy. Such contentions, in the
light of the consistent interpretation in cases of this Court, seem
entirely untenable and of value only as academic exercises.
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States." 57 He quoted from Cantwell v. Connecticut, a unanimous
decision handed down seven years before Everson: "The First
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legisla-
tures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such
laws." 58
Justice Stevens then quoted two paragraphs from Justice
Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
published in the 1830s, which, as we will see, were bound to
present some difficulty to Justice Rehnquist. Justice Story
wrote:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution,
and of the amendment to it, now under consideration
[First Amendment], the general, if not the universal sen-
timent in America was, that christianity ought to receive
encouragement from the state, so far as was not incom-
patible with the private rights of conscience, and the free-
dom of religious worship. An attempt to level all
religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold
all in utter indifference, would have created universal dis-
approbation, if not universal indignation.59
The second paragraph read:
The real object of the amendment was, not to coun-
tenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Juda-
ism, or infidelity, by prostrating christianity; but to
exclude all rivalry among christian sects, and to prevent
any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should
give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the
national government. It thus cut off the means of reli-
gious persecution, (the vice and pest of former ages), and
of the subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of
religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the
days of the Apostles to the present age . .6o
Justice Stevens proceeded to reject this interpretation of the
first amendment as one which had failed to withstand
57. 472 U.S. at 48-49.
58. Id. at 50 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940)).
59. Id. at 52 n.36 (quoting 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1874) 3d ed.
1851) (Stevens' emphasis omitted).
60. Id. (quoting 2J. STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1877) (Stevens' emphasis
omitted).
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"examin[ation] in the crucible of litigation."'6  Rather, he
stated, "the First Amendment embraces the right to select any
religious faith or none at all." ' 62 This approach, he explained,
was founded on three bases: respect for individual freedom, a
belief that the only genuine faiths are those chosen voluntarily
by the faithful, and a political interest in preventing intolerance
and conflict, not only among Christian sects, as Justice Story
thought, but among all religions and equally among the reli-
gious, the unbelievers, and the uncertain.
63
Justice Stevens quoted from Engel the statement that "a
union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion."'  He quoted too from Everson the
statement that "neither a state nor the Federal Government...
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another."' 65 Stevens also invoked the pur-
pose-effect-entanglement trilogy, under which unconstitution-
ality as to any one prong results in the invalidity of the
statute. 66 He then held that, under the facts of the case (includ-
ing assertions by sponsors of the law that it was an effort to
return prayer to the public schools), the purpose of the silent
prayer provision violated the establishment clause, just as
did the articulated prayer provision, and was equally
unconstitutional.6 7
Justice Stevens' opinion is not a comprehensive statement
of Supreme Court establishment clause doctrine. That is itself
significant. Despite the comprehensive rejection of all the
Supreme Court's works by the district court, a rejection which,
as we shall see, was endorsed by Justice Rehnquist, the Court
majority saw no need to reevaluate or even reiterate at length
its separationist position.
B. Justice Powell Concurs
Although Justice Powell concurred in the Stevens opinion,
he also felt it necessary to express agreement with Justice
O'Connor's assertion that some moment-of-silence statutes
(e.g. the Alabama silent meditation law) might be constitu-
tional, 68 a suggestion already set forth in Stevens' opinion. 69
61. Id. at 52.
62. Id. at 53.
63. Id. at 53-54.
64. Id. at 54-55 n.39 (quoting 370 U.S. at 431).
65. Id. at 53 n.37, (quoting 330 U.S. at 15) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 55-56.
67. Id. at 56-61.
68. Id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Since, as has been noted, Mr. Jaffree had accepted that posi-
tion, which nobody now opposed, it would seem unnecessary
and inappropriate, under the principle of mootness, for the
Justices to express their positions on that section. This con-
duct in Jafree presents an interesting contrast with what later
happened in the case of Karcher v. May.70 There, the United
States Court of Appeals had ruled violative of the establish-
ment clause's purpose prong a New Jersey statute which pro-
vided that principals and teachers in public elementary and
high schools should "permit students to observe a one minute
period of silence to be used solely at the discretion of the indi-
vidual student, before the opening exercise of each school day
for quiet and private contemplation or introspection."'"
The New Jersey State Attorney General immediately
announced that he would not defend the statute if it were chal-
lenged, as indeed it was in a suit instituted by a teacher, and
some public school students and their parents. In view of that
fact, Alan Karcher, the Speaker of the Assembly and Carmen
Orechia, President of the Senate, were allowed by the district
court to intervene on behalf of the New Jersey legislature. The
district court, after trial, declared the law unconstitutional on
all three aspects of the purpose-effect-entanglement test.72
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment but only in respect
to the purpose prong of the establishment clause.7" What hap-
pened next was that Karcher and Orechia were displaced from
their offices, but still remained members of the legislature, and
sought in that capacity to appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. It would seem that in this state of affairs, and given the
importance of determining a significant issue that involved not
only the states which have enacted the New Jersey bill but those
that might do so, the Supreme Court would have proceeded to
decide it. Unfortunately, it did not, but dismissed the case
because Karcher and Orechia no longer represented the State
of New Jersey and therefore lacked standing to pursue the
appeal." The Justices scrupulously refrained from voicing any
opinion on the merits of New Jersey's moment-of-silence
statute.
All this does not mean that to Justice PowellJafree was a
tale full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. His concurring
69. Id. at 59.
70. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-4 (West Supp. 1987).
72. May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983).
73. Karcher v. May, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985).
74. Karcher, 484 U.S. at 395.
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opinion served the purpose of reinforcing the purpose-effect-
entanglement test against Justice O'Connor, who wished to see
it revised, and against Justice Rehnquist, who wished to discard
it in its entirety. Only once since Lemon was decided (namely in
Marsh v. Chambers),75 said Justice Powell, had the Court
addressed an establishment clause issue without resort to the
three-pronged test. "Yet," he added, "continued criticism of it
could encourage other courts to feel free to decide Establish-
ment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis."76
C. Justice O'Connor: For Judgment but Not Opinion
Justice O'Connor opened her concurring opinion by not-
ing that all parties to the litigation conceded the validity of the
enactment providing "a moment of silence" (Ala. Code Sec.
16-1-20 (Sept. 1984)); and this even though it may be pre-
sumed that one or more of the pupils will use the moment of
silence for prayer. (Of this, more later.) At issue was the con-
stitutional validity of the additional and subsequent statute
(Ala. Code Sec. 16-1-20.1) which was enacted solely to officially
encourage prayer during the moment of silence. For her part
that statute violated the establishment clause, since there could
be little doubt that the purpose and likely effect was to endorse
and sponsor voluntary prayer in the public schools. In her view
the inquiry in Lemon v. Kurtzman as to the purpose and effect of
a statute required courts to examine whether the government's
purpose was to endorse religion and whether the statute actu-
ally conveyed a message of endorsement.
77
She recognized that a state-sponsored moment of silence
was different from unconstitutional state-sponsored vocal
prayer [as in Abington School District v. Schempp 78] or Bible read-
ing, [as in Engel v. Vitale79 ] continued Justice O'Connor. In the
first place a moment of silence was not inherently religious and
need not be associated with a religious exercise. "Second, a
pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not com-
promise his or her beliefs. During a moment of silence, a stu-
dent who objects to prayer is left to his or her own thoughts,
75. 463 U.S. 738 (1983) (upholding practice of opening state legislative
session with prayer from paid chaplain).
76. 472 U.S. at 63. Powell also said he believed the silent prayer law
passed muster under the effect and entanglement tests. Id. at 66-67.
77. Id. at 67-68.
78. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
79. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of
others."8 o
In Lynch v. Donnelly,1 continued Justice O'Connor, she had
suggested the position that the religious liberty protected by
the Establishment Clause was infringed when the government
made adherence to religion relevant to a person standing in the
political community. Under her view in that case, the inquiry in
Lemon as to the purpose and effect of a statute required courts
to examine whether the statute actually conveyed a message of
endorsement.
However, a further consideration of Lynch is relevant to the
present paper. There by a 5-4 vote, with Justice O'Connor
presenting her own special concurring opinion, the Court
upheld the presence of a creche which was owned by the city
but placed every Christmas in a park owned by a nonprofit
organization and located in the heart of the shopping district.
The Court pointed out that the creche was not the only part of
the display; together with it was a Santa Clause house, reindeer
pulling Santa's sleigh, carolers, candy-striped poles, a Christ-
mas tree, cutout figures representing such characters as a
clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored
lights, and a large banner that read "SEASON'S GREET-
INGS." All the components of the display, not only the creche,
were owned by the city, which also paid for the erection and
dismantling (at a cost of $20 per year), and the nominal
expenses incurred in lighting the creche.82
Justice O'Connor concurred with the Court's decision but
made a reservation to the concurrence. The display, she said,
did not communicate a message that the government intended
to endorse the Christian beliefs represented by the creche, or
had the effect of enforcing Christianity. 3 [As Justice
O'Connor was the deciding vote in Lynch v. Donnelly, so was she
in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union only this
time it was in the opposite direction.]8 4
In expressing her position in Jafree, Justice O'Connor
made it clear that this was probably an unusual exception to an
unusual situation. Twenty-five states, she pointed out, permit-
ted or required public school teachers to have students observe
a moment of silence in their classrooms. True enough a few
80. 472 U.S. at 72.
81. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
82. Id. at 671.
83. Id. at 694.
84. 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3117-24 (1989).
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state laws provided that the moment of silence was for medita-
tion alone; but the typical statute called for a moment of silence
at the beginning of the school day during which students might
"meditate, pray, or reflect on the activities of the day."85
The Court [she said in completing her concurring
opinion] does not hold that the Establishment Clause is
so hostile to religion that it precludes the States from
prayer. To the contrary, the moment of silence statutes
of many States should satisfy the Establishment Clause
standard we have here applied. The Court holds only
that Alabama has intentionally crossed the line between
creating a quiet moment during which those so inclined
may pray, and affirmatively endorsing the particular reli-
gious practice of prayer. This line may be a fine one, but
our precedents and the principles of religious liberty
require that we draw it.8 6
It is here that I suggest the unrealism of Justice
O'Connor's statement that silent prayer is an aspect of mind-
action equal to (but not more or less than) meditation or reflec-
tion of the activities of the day. Any synagogue-attending Jew
can tell you that a specific prayer is read by every congregant in
complete silence, not once but three times each day. In Chris-
tian churches, too, as is well known, prayer in silence is a signif-
icant part of religious services, as is a prayer of thankfulness
before and/or after meals at home (a practice long anticipated
in the Hebrew religion).
Why in light of all this was it necessary for legislatures in
twenty-five states to enact laws permitting or requiring public
school teachers to have students observe a moment of silence
in their classrooms during which they might meditate, pray or
reflect on the activities of the day? School teachers can testify
that on innumerable occasions they have called upon a talkative
class to be silent for a minute or so during the school day with-
out needing any special legislative mandate to do so. Besides
this, how does the teacher explain what it means to "medi-
tate"? It looks quite silly for a teacher to order the class every
morning to meditate without telling them what that means.
And what happens if she herself puts her hands together and
lowers her head or even crosses herself while she meditates?
Would not the pupils think that if the teacher does that, so
should they? How would Jewish parents (or atheistic as in
85. 472 U.S. at 70-71.
86. Id. at 84.
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McCollum,8 7 or Torcaso8 or in the case we are now considering)
feel if their children crossed themselves when they sat down to
the evening meal (because if the teacher did it, it must be
right)?
The crux of the matter, I suggest, lies in the reality that the
Supreme Court having time and again rejected an effort to
bring articulate prayer into the public schools, half of the States
have decided to compromise on silent prayer. In this instance,
I suggest, silence is not better than nothing but the equal of it.
D. The Chief Justice Dissents
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
Some who trouble to read the opinions in this case
will find it ironic - perhaps even bizarre - that on the
very day we heard arguments in this case, the Court's ses-
sion opened with an invocation for Divine protection.
Across the park a few hundred yards away, the House of
Representatives and the Senate regularly open each ses-
sion with a prayer. These legislative prayers are not just
one minute in duration, but are extended, thoughtful
invocations and prayers for Divine guidance. They are
given, as they have been since 1789, by clergy appointed
as official Chaplains and paid from the Treasury of the
United States. Congress has also provided chapels in the
Capitol, at public expense, where Members and others
may pause for prayer, meditation - or a moment of
silence.
8 9
What Chief Justice Burger did inJaffree was to avail himself
of an old and oft-used device going back to Church of Holy Trin-
ity v. United States.°" There the Court said:
If we pass beyond these matters to a view of Ameri-
can life as expressed by its laws, its business, its customs
and its society, we find everywhere a clear recognition of
the same truth. Among other matters note the following:
The form of oath universally prevailing, concluding with
an appeal to the Almighty; the custom of opening ses-
sions of all deliberative bodies and most conventions
with prayer; the prefatory words of all wills, "In the name
of God, amen"; the laws respecting the observance of the
87. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
88. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
89. Id. at 84-85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
90. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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Sabbath, with the general cessation of all secular busi-
ness, and the closing of courts, legislatures, and other
similar public assemblies on that day; the churches and
church organizations which abound in every city, town
and hamlet; the multitude of charitable organizations
existing everywhere under Christian auspices, the gigan-
tic missionary associations, with general support, and
aiming to establish Christian missions in every quarter of
the globe. These, and many other matters which might
be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to the
mass of organic utterances that this is a Christian
nation."
This is basically what Justice Douglas said in Zorach v. Clauson
(although he obviously could not say that we are a Christian
people, so he used the word "religious," but the net result was
the same).92 The following is what he said:
We are a religious people whose institutions presup-
pose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to
worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a
variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man
deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of
government that shows no partiality to any one group
and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its
adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with reli-
gious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our tradi-
tions. For it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their
spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find
in the Constitution a requirement that the government
show a callous indifference to religious groups. That
would be preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe.93
This type of litany begs more questions than it answers. Few of
these examples have actually been upheld as constitutional.
Instead, lawsuits challenging them are dismissed for lack of
standing, or because any constitutional violation is de minimis.
They have not survived the "crucible of litigation" to which
Justice Stevens referred. 94 The only time the Supreme Court
91. Id. at 471.
92. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
93. Id. at 313-14.
94. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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upheld a practice simply because it had a long historical tradi-
tion was the legislative chaplain case, Marsh v. Chambers,95
which I have already mentioned. There the Supreme Court,
with scarcely a mention of the establishment clause, upheld a
Nebraska practice of using tax funds to pay a minister to recite
a prayer at each session of the state legislature. The Marsh
opinion was neither separationist nor nonpreferentialist. If it
expressed any doctrine at all, it was that of Alexander Pope:
"whatever is, is right." That is hardly a persuasive argument.
E. Justice White Dissenting
Next among the dissenters was Justice White. His opinion
was brief. For the most part, he said, he agreed with Burger's
opinion. To him the first amendment did not proscribe a
moment of silence for meditation or prayer. "[I]f a student
asked whether he could pray during that moment, it is difficult
to believe that the teacher could not answer in the affirmative.
If that is the case, I would not invalidate a statute that at the
outset provided the legislative answer to the question 'May I
pray?' "96 As for the establishment clause, Justice White appre-
ciated Justice Rehnquist's explication of it. He himself, he
noted, had been out of step with many of the Court's decisions
on the subject, and thus would support a basic reconsideration
of its precedents.9"
F. Justice Rehnquist's Repentance
In reviewing Justice Rehnquist's attack on strict separation,
it is worth keeping in mind that he joined in the Court's opin-
ion in Lemon,9 8 in which the three-prong test for the establish-
ment clause was first invoked to nullify a statute. Although he
does not mention this fact in his dissent, he displays the well-
known zeal of a convert.
Justice Rehnquist began his dissent inJaffree by noting that
thirty-eight years earlier the Court, in Everson, had summarized
its exegesis of the establishment clause by stating: "In the
words ofJefferson, the clause against establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
church and State.' "" He could hardly avoid recognizing that
in 1879 the Court had referred to this wall in Reynolds v. United
95. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
96. 472 U.S. at 91 (White, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
99. 472 U.S. at 91 (quoting 330 U.S. at 16).
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States.' 00 But that, he said, was truly inapt because Reynolds was
a free exercise rather than an establishment clause case, and it
dealt with a Mormon's challenge to a federal polygamy law.''
The "wall of separation" phrase bothered Justice Rehn-
quist ever so much, although it is hard to believe that any of the
establishment clause cases would have been decided differently
had Jefferson never used that phrase in his letter to the Dan-
bury Baptist Association. But bother him it did. Jefferson, he
pointed out, was in France at the time when the first ten
amendments were adopted by Congress and the states.
Besides, his letter to the Baptists was no more than "a short
note of courtesy," written 14 years after the amendments were
passed by Congress.'0 2
This description of the Danbury letter was not original
with Justice Rehnquist. James O'Neill, whose discussion of the
subject became standard reading for accommodationists,' 1 3
described Jefferson's "wall of separation" as a "figure of
speech" in a "little address of courtesy" to the Baptists, and no
more than that.' 4 Professor Edward Corwin, for his part, sug-
gested that the letter was not improbably motivated by "an
impish desire to heave a brick at the Congregationalist-Federal-
ist hierarchy of Connecticut .. ,,0.5
The trouble with all this is that it is simply not so. Jeffer-
son's own testimony reveals that he submitted the Danbury let-
ter to his Attorney General, Levi Lincoln, together with the
following letter:
Averse to receive addresses, yet unable to prevent
them, I have generally endeavored to turn them to some
account, by making them the occasion, by way of answer,
of sowing useful truths & principles among the people,
which might germinate and become rooted among their
political tenets. The Baptist address, now enclosed,
admits of a condemnation of the alliance between Church
& State, under the authority of the Constitution. It fur-
nishes an occasion, too, which I have long wished to find,
of saying why I do not proclaim fastings and thanksgiv-
ings, as my predecessors did.
100. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
101. 472 U.S. at 92 n.1.
102. Id. at 92.
103. J. O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
(1949).
104. Id. at 82-83.
105. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: ESSAYS BY EDWARD S.
CORWIN 204-05 (A.T. Mason and G. Garvey eds. 1964).
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The address, to be sure, does not point at this, and
its introduction is awkward. But I foresee no opportunity
of doing it more pertinently .... Will you be so good as
to examine the answer, and suggest any alterations which
might prevent an ill effect, or promote a good one among
the people?.. 6
Plainly, Jefferson regarded his letter as more than a "little
address of courtesy."
Probably neither these considerations nor anything else
could affect Justice Rehnquist's strong (almost phobic) feelings
against Jefferson's letter. "The 'wall of separation between
church and State,' " he said, "is metaphor based on bad his-
tory, a metaphor which proved useless as a guide to judging. It
should be frankly and explicitly abandoned."' 0 7 This conclu-
sion, of course, does not depend on the accuracy of Justice
Rehnquist's historical analysis. Considering, however, that the
thrust of his dissent was that the Supreme Court had miscon-
strued the history of the establishment clause, the historical
error which opens his opinion should give us pause.
The major part ofJustice Rehnquist's dissent dealt with his
assertion that the no-aid principle of Everson, McCollum and
their progeny, together with the purpose-effect-entanglement
trilogy in Walz, Lemon and their progeny, were all mistaken.
According to him, the Court had erred in holding that the
establishment clause was intended to be anything more than an
instrument "to prohibit the establishment of a national reli-
gion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among the sects.
He [Madison] did not see it as requiring neutrality between
religion and irreligion."'' 8 To support his position, Justice
Rehnquist invoked and dealt in detail with the proceedings in
Congress that led to the adoption of the establishment
clause.'0 9 There is, I suggest, little purpose in discussing this
aspect of the Rehnquist dissenting opinion. For my own part, I
first wrote on this historical question forty years ago,'' 0 have
returned to it many times since, and have little new to add. In
any event, as has been noted, the Supreme Court has rejected
Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the establishment clause,
and its rejection has been supported by reputable scholars
106. Quoted in L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 134 (1967).
107. 472 U.S. at 107.
108. Id. at 98.
109. Id. at 92-99.
110. Pfeffer, Religion, Education and the Constitution, 8 LAWYERs GUILD
REV. 387 (1948); Pfeffer, Church and State: Something Less Than Separation, 19 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1951).
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(although disputed by Professor Cord and others)."' Instead
we turn now to consider his other evidence. Justice Rehnquist
quoted the same two paragraphs from Justice Story's treatise
that Justice Stevens had cited:
"Probably at the time of the adoption of the Consti-
tution, and of the amendment to it, now under considera-
tion [First Amendment], the general if not the universal
sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to
receive encouragement from the State so far as was not
incompatible with the private rights of conscience and
the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all
religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold
all in utter indifference, would have created universal dis-
approbation, if not universal indignation....
"The real object of the [First] [A]mendment was not
to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism,
or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but
to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to pre-
vent any national ecclesiastical establishment which
should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the
national government. It thus cut off the means of reli-
gious persecution (the vice and pest of former ages), and
of the subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of
religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the
days of the Apostles to the present age .... ,112
These two paragraphs are obviously not nonpreferentialist.
They explicitly call for preference of Christianity over other
religions. Indeed, Justice Stevens had cited them as an out-
moded interpretation of the establishment clause for precisely
that reason.' 3 Justice Rehnquist, by contrast, drew the conclu-
sion that "[i]t would seem from this evidence that the Estab-
lishment clause of the First Amendment had acquired a well-
accepted meaning: it forbade establishment of a national reli-
gion, and forbade preference among religious sects or
denominations." 1
4
With all due respect to the current ChiefJustice, the quota-
tion from Story shows nothing of the kind. Story's analysis is
111. See, e.g., T. CURRY,.THE FIRST FREEDOM: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); L. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); L.
PFEFFER, supra note 99.
112. 472 U.S. at 104-05 (quoting 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES 630-32 (5th
ed. 1891)).
113. Id. at 52 n.36.
114. Id. at 106.
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part and parcel of the conception of the United States as a
Christian nation.' If Justice Rehnquist truly believed that
Story's position reflects a controlling original intent regarding
the meaning of the establishment clause, then he would have to
reject, not only strict separationism, but nonpreferentialism as
well. When he said that the first amendment forbids "prefer-
ence among religious sects or denominations," he was aban-
doning Story, not relying on him.
Justice Rehnquist also quoted from Thomas Cooley's Con-
stitutional Limitations. Cooley's eminence as a legal authority,
said Justice Rehnquist, rivaled that of Story, and like Story,
Cooley recognized that it was aid to a particular religious sect
that was prohibited by the Constitution.
But while thus careful to establish, protect, and
defend religious freedom and equality [Cooley wrote],
the American constitutions contain no provisions which
prohibit the authorities from such solemn recognition of
a superintending Providence in public transactions and
exercises as the general religious sentiment of mankind
inspires, and as seems meet and proper in finite and
dependent beings. Whatever may be the shades of reli-
gious belief, all must acknowledge the fitness of recogniz-
ing in important human affairs the superintending care
and control of the Great Governor of the Universe, and
of acknowledging with thanksgiving his boundless favors,
or bowing in contrition when visited with the penalties of
his broken laws. No principle of constitutional law is vio-
lated when thanksgiving or fast days are appointed; when
chaplains are designated for the army and navy; when
legislative sessions are opened with prayer or the reading
of the Scriptures, or when religious teaching is
encouraged by a general exemption of the houses of reli-
gious worship from taxation for the support of State gov-
ernment. Undoubtedly the spirit of the Constitution will
require, in all these cases, that care be taken to avoid dis-
crimination in favor of or against any one religious
denomination; but the power to do any of these things
does not become unconstitutional simply because of its
susceptibility to abuse. This public recognition of reli-
gious worship, however, is not based entirely, perhaps
not even mainly, upon a sense of what is due to the
Supreme Being himself as the author of all good and of
all law; but the same reasons of state policy which induce
115. L. PFEFFER, supra note 99, at 243-47.
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the government to aid institutions of charity and seminar-
ies of instruction will incline it also to foster religious
worship and religious institutions, as conservators of the
public morals and valuable, if not indispensable, assist-
ants to the preservation of the public order. 16
As we have seen, some of Cooley's eminent contemporar-
ies, such as Jeremiah Black, were less accommodationist than
he was. Cooley himself noted that the "propriety of making
provisions for the appointment of chaplains for the two houses
of Congress and for the army and navy, has been sometimes
questioned."' 1 7 What should be noted here is that none of
Cooley's examples would require reversal of any current
Supreme Court precedents. Thanksgiving day proclamations
and military chaplains have never been challenged in the
Supreme Court, and legislative prayers and tax exemption for
churches have been upheld by it." 8 It is therefore difficult to
understand how the citation from Cooley supports Justice
Rehnquist's argument that all prior Supreme Court establish-
ment clause jurisprudence should be rejected.
Justice Rehnquist gives considerable space to George
Washington's rather long proclamation of thanks to Almighty
God. He notes that Washington, Adams and Madison all
issued Thanksgiving Proclamations, but that Jefferson did not,
and he quotes Jefferson's reason for not doing so, namely that
fasting and prayer are religious exercises and the enjoining of
them belongs to the people where the Constitution has depos-
ited them.' 1 9 So much attention is paid to these proclamations
that Justice O'Connor commented that "[t]he primary issue
raised by Justice Rehnquist's dissent is whether the historical
fact that our Presidents have long called for public prayers of
thanks should be dispositive of the constitutionality of prayer in
public schools." 1 2 0
What Justice Rehnquist said at this point was the truth, but
not the whole truth. In the first place, Jefferson was not the
only President who refused to issue Thanksgiving Proclama-
tions; Andrew Jackson also refused, and for the same reason:
because (although he was a good Presbyterian) he stood for the
116. 472 U.S. at 105-06 (quoting T. COOLEY, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 470-71).
117. T. COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 206
(1880).
118. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Walz v. Commissioner,
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
119. 472 U.S. at 100-03.
120. Id. at 81.
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principle of strict separation of Church and State.12' Second,
although Washington took pains to frame his proclamation in
language acceptable to all faiths, his successor, John Adams,
called for Christian worship. 122 Reliance on Adams therefore
presents the same problem as reliance on Story: if his example
is to be followed, nonpreferentialism must be discarded along
with strict separationism. Third, although Madison did issue
Thanksgiving proclamations, that is not all there is to the story.
He did indeed issue Thanksgiving proclamations, but he was
hardly happy about them. This is what he said in his Detached
Memoranda:
During the administration of Mr. Jefferson no reli-
gious proclamation was issued. It being understood that
his successor was disinclined to such interpositions of the
Executive and by some supposed moreover that they
might originate with more propriety with the Legislative
Body, a resolution was passed requesting him to issue a
proclamation. [See the resolution in the Journals of
Congress.]
It was thought not proper to refuse a compliance
altogether; but a form and language were employed,
which were meant to deaden as much as possible any
claim of political right to enjoin religious observances by
resting these expressly on the voluntary compliance of
individuals, and even by limiting the recommendation to
such as wished simultaneous as well as voluntary per-
formance of a religious act on the occasion.'
23
What all this means is that it is politically unwise not to issue
Thanksgiving Proclamations and it may be politically helpful if
you do. In any event, what have you got to lose if you do?
(George Bush was later to do very well with the Pledge of Alle-
giance.) This was not the only occasion when Madison as Presi-
dent chose for political reasons not to follow rigorously his
constitutional beliefs (consider for instance, his acceptance of a
national bank), and little weight should be attached to it.
Justice Rehnquist's other uses of historical examples are
equally erratic. For instance, he notes that early Congresses
121. A.P. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 504-06 (1964).
122. L. PFEFFER, supra note 99, at 266.
123. Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda ", 3 WM & MARY Q. (3rd
Series) 534, 562 (1946); see generally Pfeffer, Madison's "Detached Memoranda ".-
Then and Now, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 283 (M.D.
Peterson & R.C. Vaughan eds. 1988).
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authorized granting land to religious institutions. 24 However,
he omits Madison's veto of a bill giving certain land to a Baptist
church
• .. because the bill in reserving a certain parcel of land of
the United States for the use of said Baptist Church com-
prises a principle and a precedent for the appropriation
of funds of the United States for the use and support of
religious societies, contrary to the article of the Constitu-
tion which declares that 'Congress shall make no law
respecting a religious establishment' [sic].'
2 5
Madison referred to this veto in his Detached Memoranda:
Strongly guarded as is the separation between Reli-
gion & Govt in the Constitution of the United States the
danger of precedents already furnished in their short his-
tory. (See the cases in which negatives were put by J.M.
on two bills passed by Congs. and his signature withheld
from another. See also attempt in Kentucky, for exam-
ple, where it was proposed to exempt Houses of Worship
from taxes.' 
26
The uselessness of the no-aid and of the purpose-effect-
entanglement tests to adjudge controversies, said justice Rehn-
quist, is proved by their chaotic histories. "For example," he
wrote,
a State may lend to parochial school children geography
textbooks that contain maps of the United States, but the
State may not lend maps of the United States for use in
geography class. A State may lend textbooks on Ameri-
can colonial history, but it may not lend a film on George
Washington, or a film projector to show it in history
class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may
not lend workbooks in which the parochial school chil-
dren write, thus rendering them nonreusable. A State
may pay for bus transportation to religious schools but
may not pay for bus transportation from parochial school
to the public zoo or natural history museum for a field
trip. A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted
in the parochial school but therapeutic services must be
given in a different building; speech and hearing "serv-
ices" conducted by the State inside the sectarian school
are forbidden, but the State may conduct speech and
124. 472 U.S. at 103 n.5.
125. L. PFEFFER, supra note 99, at 157.
126. Fleet, supra note 116, at 555.
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hearing diagnostic testing inside the sectarian school.
Exceptional parochial school students may receive coun-
seling, but it must take place outside of the parochial
school, such as in a trailer parked down the street. A
State may give cash to a parochial school to pay for the
administration of state-written tests and state-ordered
reporting services, but it may not provide funds for
teacher prepared tests on secular subjects. Religious
instruction may not be given in public school, but the
public school may release students during the day for
religion classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at
these classes with its truancy laws.
1 2 7
Sounds terrible, does it not? But it's hardly as terrible as it
seems. Add free exercise to establishment and you have -170
pages of case annotations in United States Code Annotated;
free speech and press clauses gives you 620 pages, and
searches and seizures gives you 1080 pages. The Supreme
Court has had just as much trouble with these clauses as with
the religion clauses of the first amendment.
I should add that in some respects I agree with Justice
Rehnquist. I too think some of the distinctions the Court has
drawn between permissible and impermissible aid to religious
schools are unpersuasive; in fact, as an attorney I argued to the
Court against allowing some of the types of aid the Court held
to be constitutional. Thus, whatJustice Rehnquist has shown is
that if the Court had only always ruled in my favor, its position
would have been fully consistent. I doubt that this is the lesson
Justice Rehnquist would want us to draw.
Justice Rehnquist would discard the purpose-effect-entan-
glement test of Lemon, the no-aid principle of Everson, and Jef-
ferson's wall of separation. He would substitute a
nonpreferentialist interpretation of the establishment clause in
their place. But, as we have seen, his history is at best selective
and one-sided and his criticism of current Court doctrine weak.
Finally, he never responds to, or even addresses, the underly-
ing principles of strict separationism, the principles stated by
Roger Williams in his image of the ship at sea, by Madison in
his Memorial & Remonstrance 128 and Detached Memoranda, by Jef-
ferson in his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, and by
so many others throughout American history.
127. 472 U.S. at 110-11 (citations omitted).
128. Quoted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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The Court has not accepted Justice Rehnquist's conclu-
sions. One month after the Court decided Jaffree, it decided
School District of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball 29 and Aguilar v. Fel-
ton, '3 both of which involved aid to religious schools. In each
the Court found the aid violative of the establishment clause,
and in each of them Justice Rehnquist dissented "for the rea-
sons stated in [his] opinion" inJaffree. "The Court," he said in
Grand Rapids, "relies heavily on the principles of Everson v.
Board of Education and McCollum v. Board of Education, but
declines to discuss the faulty 'wall' premise upon which those
cases rest. In doing so the Court blinds itself to the first 150
years' history of the Establishment Clause."'
13 '
In 1987 the Court, in Edwards v. Aguillard,13 1 over the dis-
sent of newJustice Antonin Scalia and new ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist, held violative of the establishment clause Louisiana's
Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Sci-
ence in Public Instruction Act' 3 3 which provided that if evolu-
tion was taught in a public school, so also must creation science
be taught. The purpose of the statute, said the Court in an
opinion by Justice Brennan, was the advancement of religion,
and a trial was not necessary to establish that fact. This case,
along with Aguilar, Grand Rapids, the 1988 term's creche case
1 34
indicate with reasonable clearness that for the time being at
least strict separationism still lives.
129. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
130. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
131. 473 U.S. at 400-01 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
133. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1 - .7.
134. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
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